My brother, George Payne, was able to conduct only one interview in September 1999 before he died the next year of cancer:
SYLVIA CZAYO - Click on View Text link.
Interviewed by: George Payne
Interview date: September 1999
SECRETARY WILLIAM J. CROCKETT
Interviewed by: Thomas Stern
Initial interview date: June 20, 1990|
Copyright 1998 ADST
CROCKETT:Under Secretary George Ball did. He had an assistant, George Springsteen, who followed developments and informed Ball. Ball discussed them with me and asked about the why and wherefore. It was primarily for information. He never indicated any concern. Nor did he provide any support. That was another mistake I made. I did not involve my principles sufficiently so that they were committed to my programs and initiatives. That was true of CCPS (Comprehensive Country Programming System) and all of my initiatives. I went forward hell bent and didn't take the time to build support from other Seventh Floor principals.
Q: You had an interesting staff working for you. I like to have your comments on some of them. Let's start with Mich Cieplinski, whom you have already mentioned.
CROCKETT: Mich came as a gift from John Rooney and Senator Thomas Dodd. Senator Dodd was on the Internal Security Committee. When I became Deputy Under Secretary, that Committee was headed by Senator Hruska of Nebraska. He was the most conservative of conservatives. That Committee was after State Department for all sorts of alleged security breaches. They got their information from Otto Otepka who worked in our Office of Security. Dodd was the only friend we had and so we cultivated him. Mich was his token ethnic and also Rooney's. They twisted my arm to employ him and so we did.
Q: Let me ask about one more: Marvin Gentile.
CROCKETT: As a result of the Otepka problem, we had to move John O'Reilly, who was then the head of the Security Office. He had gotten in trouble with the Internal Security Committee and there was also an episode in which he and some of his staff had tried to "bug" Otepka's telephone and open his safe.. Otepka, we learned through an FBI investigation, was feeding personnel data to the Internal Security Committee. In any case, O'Reilly and his deputy, Dave Belisle, had taken unauthorized actions against Otepka. Not only were they unsuccessful, but their activities became known to the Internal Security Committee. I had to remove both of them from their jobs. Both were facing possible charges of illegal activities and I was really concerned. I had to appear before the Committee and defend them. Fortunately, no actions were taken and we were able to re-assign both.
"The Ship of State is the only vessel with which I am familiar that leaks mainly at the top", said Secretary Dean Rusk one time when we were directed by the President's office to "shut off those damned leaks to the press!". Often, when investigated, we found that the real source was at or near the top of the Department. Nevertheless, leaks are an irritant to the leadership and every President, sooner or later, becomes so aggravated with people giving out unauthorized information to the press that he reacts very violently. This is a predictable Presidential pattern. "Leaks must be stopped and the leakers found and punished". Aggressive steps are often taken by the President and his staff to stop leaks and find the leakers--including lie detectors, oaths, rigid rules of conduct and other harsh, but mostly futile remedies.
It was obvious to us--the Secretary and his chief assistants--that there was a serious security leak in the State Department. The most sensitive and secret information in any institution is the content of an employee's personnel file, including information collected during a security investigation, even a pre-employment one. Every alleged indiscretion, transgression, error of judgement, every embarrassing incident and every private relationship over time go into a personnel file. In those days, those files were kept from the individual concerned, so that they did not know the contents and had no opportunity to set the record straight. This raw material was getting to Congress and the press. We obviously had a very serious leak.
the personal nature of such information and the devastating impact its loose
dissemination could have on the lives of people, Congress had passed a law
prohibiting any person responsible for the files from revealing their contents
to an authorized person. Specifically, members of Congress were listed as being
unauthorized recipients, unless the head of an agency made a personal
determination to release a file. The early days of the Kennedy Administration
came close upon the heels of the McCarthy era. During that sad period in the
Eisenhower Administration, the Foreign Service and the State Department were
the most scarred of all agencies from the inquisitorial impact of those
dreadful days.. A McCarthy henchman had been appointed
as head of the Security Office of the Department and under his supervision a
witch hunt had ensued that ruined the careers and lives of dozens of State and
Foreign Service officials. Few, if any Communists,
were found, but the fear of McCarthy hung over the Department like a pall. The
chief problems were legitimate career problems--i.e. if an officer predicted
the political outcome based on certain policies, would he be punished,
regardless whether he had been right or wrong?. The famous example
of course were the
(DAVID DEAN Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy Initial interview date: July 21, 1998 Mine is a chapter in the book and Nat Bellocchi will write a chapter, David Lanx, Jim Lilley, and a few others will also contribute. I have raised funds for a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo. It has been completed by a colleague in the Foreign Service, Jay Taylor, who is putting the finishing touches on the last draft and will send it up to the Harvard University Press shortly. It is a very interesting book; I have read all the different drafts. It is well written, informative, and it goes over many of the things I may have touched on. I hope Harvard will accept it and it will be a popular book.)
The same potential problems were encountered by our reporting officer in
, during the last days of Batista. No one was safe from the inquisition. Cuba
When the Kennedy administration came to power, many of the hard-line McCarthy disciples were still in control of the Security Office. When I became Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Security Office became part of my responsibilities. It was my job to stop witch hunting, to restore credibility to the political and economic reporting from the field and to ensure above all else that no personnel information from anybody's file was being given to any person without the personal authorization of Secretary Rusk.
But we had a leak. Day after day, I would be called by the Senate Internal Security Committee to be grilled about why certain people had been given security clearances, how the investigations were being conducted and why we had taken certain actions. It was obvious from the questions asked by the staff that Senators had access to our files. Motivation for leaking varies. Sometimes it is done so that a person can feel important and the leak provides self-satisfaction. Sometimes it is done under the guise of "saving the government and the country" from poor policy decisions made or about to be made by superior officials. Other times, leaks occur when someone wants to embarrass other officials. And sometimes, leakers are paid informants. A leak to Congress was a violation of law, but more importantly, it was an indication that someone on our staff was so disgruntled and upset that he/she was taking the opportunity to punish us. Also we were concerned that the individual might leak the information to the press. In any case, the action undertaken by that individual was illegal, but that didn't seem to be deterrent.
So we called The FBI to do an investigation. Some weeks later, we received a report from the Bureau indicating that the leaker was one Otto Otepka, a high ranking official in the Security Office and a hold over from the McCarthy period. He was upset with the new policies and procedures we had instituted and with the new people, especially me, with whom he had to deal. He justified his actions by saying: "I feel it is my higher duty to my country to reveal the security risks that this new Administrations is bringing into government. I am willing to break the law and sacrifice my career to bring this practice to a halt".
The Internal Security Committee of course denied the charges, but the FBI fingered it as being the recipient of the information. The leaks stopped and the Committee's inquisitorial attitude towards us softened. As a result we developed a more collaborative and less adversarial relationship with the Committee which served both the Congress and the Department well. As for Otepka, we fired him, but his appealed dragged on forever. Finally the Department's action was sustained. But he was subsequently appointed by the Nixon administration to another security office position in the government. I had a close association with Dick Helms, who at that time was the Deputy Director of CIA. We met two or three times a year to discuss our mutual problems. We used the CIA's communications facilities. During one of our discussions, he offered to give us Marv Gentile as our Security Officer. He was a down-to-earth, non-bureaucratic and courageous person. He was not afraid to do what was right. He was a breath of fresh air in our security program and he made the program a professional arm of the Department.
Q: While on the subject of personnel, I would like to remind you of Abba Schwartz, who was the controversial Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. I believe that was somewhat of a misnomer because Security had been split from that Bureau before your appointment as Deputy Under Secretary. How did Schwartz come to the Department?
CROCKETT: A man by the name of Haynes was the Administrator before Schwartz. He was not very effective. Schwartz came to the Department because Congressman Francis Walters of McCarran-Walters Act fame insisted on the appointment when he was instrumental of passing the Refugee Relief Act. Walters demanded that appointment in exchange for his cooperation and got it. So Abba was Walters' man in the Department. I didn't know Schwartz before these events. Someone in the Bureau may have because of Schwartz' involvement in refugee matters. Of course, Schwartz became Francis Knight's boss. Knight was the Chief of the Passport Division, having been there for many years following another legend, Mrs. Shipley. Like her predecessor, Knight had tried to maintain a separate entity for her Division, barely recognizing the authority over her of even the Secretary of State. She operated directly with her Hill connections and they protected her. She never bowed to the authority of the Administrator not mine. I occasionally visited her and talked to her; theoretically she was part of my responsibilities. Had I stayed longer, we would have broken up the Bureau and had the constituent parts report directly to me, as we had done for in the case of the Bureau of Administration. Interestingly enough, she then may have ended up as she wished: the head of an independent program. I must say that her power stemmed from her ability to meet congressional demands for passport services to their constituents. She had inherited a fairly ineffective operation and to her credit, she got it organized and stream-lined. During her stewardship, passports began to be issued by post offices. She did a good job, but she was completely lacking in loyalty and in any sense of team-work. Although never proven, it was suspected that she worked with certain Congressmen to pass legislation which would have made the Passport an independent agency of the government.
AMBASSADOR CHARLES ANTHONY GILLESPIE, JR.
Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date:
GILLESPIE: In January, 1965. I had continued to study international affairs during 1963 and 1964. As it turned out, I didn't get the master's degree but did a lot of study with some interesting people.
Interviewed by: Self
The Visa Office
My new assignment was in the Written Inquiries branch of the Special Consular Services Visa Office, and involved preparing written replies to visa inquiries from members of Congress. The Visa Office was headed by Julio Arias, a veteran foreign service officer. It was a good opportunity to reacquaint myself with visa operations and procedures. I became familiar with substantial changes in immigration legislation emanating from the Eastman and Rodino immigration bills. I worked with three qualified foreign service officers, Steve Dobrenchuk, Ed Martinez, and Marvin Groeneweg. Correspondence with Congress was first screened by the State Department's office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations.
July 23, due to the international crisis in
President Ford stayed the course until the end of his term. In his last State of the Union address he asked for additional military expenditures to offset the Soviet military buildup.
January 26, in a meeting with Judy Schmidt in Personnel, I learned of a
possible assignment for me in
AMBASSADOR JOHN EDWIN UPSTON
Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date:
Q: I was asked by someone who had worked with you, Tom Stern, to ask you about your dealings on the management side with Frances Knight, the Director of the Passport Office. This is sort of a peculiar institution within--really not even within the State Department--almost outside the State Department.
Yes, I know Tom Stern. He is a fine officer with a distinguished career in
management, political/military and DCM in
Q: 1968. He came in in 1969.
Yes, and not long into his administration I received a telephone call from Bill
Macomber, Ambassador William B. Macomber,
Jr., who was the new Nixon administration Deputy Under Secretary for
Management, the old Crockett position. And Bill Macomber
asked me if I would come to
The head of the Passport Agency, Frances Knight, reported to Barbara Watson. Frances Knight was and is a very conservative, arch conservative individual who had very close ties to J. Edgar Hoover, and she looked upon the Passport Agency as her own bailiwick that she had a proprietary responsibility for. She conceived herself to be somewhat of the czarina, the czar of the Passport Agency, and she wanted absolutely nothing to do with Barbara Watson and the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. She felt that if she needed to report to anybody it should be to the President or perhaps to the Secretary of State but that she had a higher calling which was primarily based on security, national security motivations and her feeling that there were a number of people within Washington and within the system who were really working against the national security of the United States and that she was the protector of that national security.
So, there was a very real management problem, and Frances Knight, since she had been in that position for some many years, had a lock on the conservatives in the House and in the Senate.
Q: I think she came in around 1955.
UPSTON: Yes, I think so. So she had stronger relationships with the conservatives in the House and the Senate than anybody in the State Department, including the Secretary of State, and her congressional relations was stronger in many respects than the bureau that dealt with congressional relations in the State Department. So she was a very real power to be reckoned with.
Elliot Richardson who was then the Under Secretary of State and Bill Macomber did a rather Machiavellian thing. They created
something called the Secretary of State's Committee to Facilitate International
Travel. They placed as the Chairman of that committee, Leverett
Saltonstall, who had been for many years, as you
remember, a very highly regarded United States Senator from the state of
Q: Ramsey Clark.
UPSTON: Yes, because Mr. Justice Tom Clark didn't think it was appropriate for him to be on the bench while his son was Attorney General, and so Mr. Justice Clark was doing the kinds of things that a former Supreme Court Justice does, but he was no longer on the bench. And then Charles Tillinghast, who was at that time the Chairman of TWA, Trans World Airlines, and the other person I remember was John Haynes, who had been Special Assistant to John Foster Dulles and had been the head of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs during the period when John Foster Dulles was Secretary. So it was a fairly high powered group, and Bill Macomber asked me if I would be the Executive Director of it.
Q: That's good. Could you just raise your voice just one minute.
UPSTON: Yes, is it working?
Q: Yes, this is Side B of Tape 1 of an interview with Ambassador John Upston on May 26. Okay.
UPSTON: There were two major problems. One was the bureaucratic internal problem between Frances Knight as the Director of the Passport Office and her bureaucratic superior Barbara Watson as Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. And that was an internal bureaucratic problem.
So what Elliot Richardson and Bill Macomber did was to basically put this very prestigious committee of distinguished Americans and me as the sacrificial lamb in the middle of this bureaucratic battle between these two ladies. And the title seemed very glamorous, Secretary of State's Committee to Facilitate International Travel, but it was basically a way to get this problem off their backs.
But there was another problem in that the volume of passports was increasing. People were not getting their passports on time. They would write letters to the Congress, to their Congressmen, with all sorts of horror stories of how they had to cancel trips and this, that and the other thing. Other problems were arising because of the heavy volume. And Frances Knight said basically, yes, there is a problem and it's the State Department's fault, and if they would just leave me alone, I would solve this problem. What she wanted was for the Passport Agency to be based on a revolving fund so that she would have complete control over the money and that the appropriation would not come through the State Department. She basically wanted to have complete autonomy.
was given an office and a secretary and a deputy, and I selected a Foreign
Service officer named Dave Betts, who went on to hold a number of important
positions in the consular field. The committee, as one would suspect because of
the distinction of the people who were on it, was fairly passive, and it was
very clear to me as the sacrificial lamb that I was going to have to come up
with some sort of solution to this. I remember having lunch with John McCone, who had been head of the CIA, at the Metropolitan
Club, and at lunch I remember saying, "Why don't we work out an
arrangement so that American citizens can apply for passports at
also seemed to me to be a little absurd for the actual passports to be
'manufactured' at passport offices in very expensive real estate. The passport
recommendation was actually made to the Secretary of State though the
Secretary's Committee and was adopted. Frances Knight was terribly upset
because she wanted to have autonomy and wanted to have her own revolving fund
and this recommendation went against her grain. She reported me to the White
House and said there were very serious national security risks in this whole
idea. And I was called over to the
of the fact that this involved a new approach, it required legislation. Wayne
Hayes, who was then in the Congress and a Democrat, represented the
administration in support of this legislation. And H.R. Gross of
There was one rather amusing thing which I recall when a liberal or moderate very distinguished Republican Peter Freylinghausen rose on the floor of the House of Representatives and said that he was associating himself with H.R. Gross because he did not feel that it was appropriate for somebody to take the oath of allegiance to the United States in a post office.
But in any event the legislation passed, and it's been a certain satisfaction to me because although it was no major contribution to public service, literally millions and millions of Americans have benefited and have had a convenience as a result of what we--
Q: I wouldn't belittle what you accomplished. Let me ask did you ever talk face to face with Frances Knight?
UPSTON: Oh, yes.
Q: How did this work?
We used to get together for Mai Tais over at Trader Vic's,
and she liked me and she felt that I was a good solid Republican, and she felt
that in the final analysis that she could manipulate me so that I would make
whatever recommendation she would like. After I came up with this rather
independent and unique solution to the problem that did not fit into her scheme
of things, there was a very decided chill. And in fact, after the legislation
was passed and the agreement was signed in the Secretary of State's office by
Secretary William P. Rogers and by Red Blunt, who was then the Postmaster
General of the
Q: Forcibly retired.
UPSTON: Yes, right, although I'm not sure. Despite everything, Francis Knight was a patriot. She had the strength of her convictions. Francis was a loyal American who served for many years. However she was not a company officer. Not a team player. A free spirit which made her a "pain in the neck" to the system.
Q: We're trying to present to the researcher in later years how things work. You came in as a Republican, but from what you're saying--and I think this is true in many cases--the Republican side was mainly, you were basically a manager working on a problem, but whatever credentials you had was really handy in dealing with maybe whatever administration was in or out of power and in Congress. It was really dealing--you didn't come in with Republican set and you were going to do things the Republican way as opposed to the Democratic way, but it helped you be a manager by warding off attacks in a way. Or not?
UPSTON: Yes, I think that's accurate. And it's interesting. Remember this was the Nixon administration. It was obviously a Republican administration. There was a management problem, and the person who represented the Nixon administration's point of view because this approach to things was approved obviously by the White House and by the Secretary of State, but the person who represented the administration in the legislation was a Democrat--Wayne Hayes of Ohio, Congressman Hayes.
was still in those days more of a feeling of bipartisan foreign policy and
Republicans and Democrats working together in order to achieve objectives. I do
not think there is that kind of feeling today to the extent that there was at
that time and particularly in the Kennedy and the early part of the Johnson
administration. Of course, there was deterioration in terms of bipartisan
foreign policy directly related, as you remember, to
Q: So this actually cut across--
UPSTON: Cut across, right.
--party lines. We do want to move on to whenn you were Ambassador to
Interviewed by: Edward Dillery
Initial interview date:
HARVEY FELDMAN: There were people in the government who
knew that that would have to happen. One of the principal people who recognized
the future was Chiang Ching-kuo. That is a whole
story in itself. In fact a friend of mine, Jay Taylor, former FSO, has written a book on
Chiang Ching-kuo; I saw the manuscript which was 850
pages long. It is being published by Harvard University Press and will be out
by the end of this year. It is a marvelous book. I want to talk at great length
later about Chiang Ching-kuo because he more than
anyone else laid the foundation for the democratization of
Chiang Ching-kuo was a very fascinating character. There is an absolutely marvelous biography which I read in manuscript which is to be published at the end of this year. It was written by Jay Taylor, a former FSO. He is a Chinese language officer; he did a lot of interviewing and had access to a lot of personal papers. It is a throughly marvelous book.
PHILIP R. MAYHEW
Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy
Initial interview date:
You were on the
R. MAYHEW: '77. The
After Dan left, in the latter part of that period, I served with 2 more country directors, Ed Hurwitz and Bob Rich.
enjoyed dealing with Koreans and enjoyed being on the desk, but spent most of
my time in bureaucratic battles here. I worked with people from other agencies
who were really quite amenable most of the time. And, of course, dealing with
Q: Were you there during the coming-in of the Carter administration, January of '77?
I was there until about mid-'77. I think we had either Jay Taylor
or Mike Armacost sitting in our office for a long
time doing a study, not on whether you should remove US troops, but on how to
Q: This is, of course, a promise that Jimmy Carter had made.
MAYHEW: He had unfortunately made this promise, it took about 6 months to pull back from it.
Q: It horrified the hell out of those of us who were sitting there.
It's certainly another instance, like so many presidential candidates who
promise to move the Tel Aviv embassy over to
Q: He was a counselor, wasn't he?
N.SKOUG: He was
Counselor in the Department of State. And he was a tough man, so we soon had
the counselor's office involved, and the counselor himself. The counselor had a
meeting with Elliott
Abrams and Elliott found himself constrained to say, yes, we would let
the charter flights fly directly subject to certain conditions. We weren't able
to fly in our stuff into
the other issue we had going on, the other sanction we had going, was a hint
that we might close the interests sections, which was really an ARA threat
because although Abrams supported it, Armacost did
not. I wasn't getting much support at this point from top levels of the
Department of State. They went ahead and "announced" Curt Kamman's position, and soon people were bidding for it, so
it would be quite clear this would leak out, and the Cubans would know that we
weren't thinking seriously of closing the interests sections. Under NSC
pressure, though, the Department of State finally had to state that we wouldn't
fill the position until this impasse on the charter support flights was solved.
That would not really be much of a tactic because what would the Cubans care?
As long as the post existed, their post would exist. What they had in mind was that
their post would exist, that Sánchez Parodi, who was a very effective operator in
Q: Were you getting any intimations all during this time that the CIA was sort of running wild there, because it was close by, and they get involved in these things without really thinking about the repercussions? Did you get that?
We didn't think so. The covert operations people we talked to never mentioned
these things. We didn't feel anything. Ferch should
have been informed of all the things going on, but he obviously wasn't, nor was
Kamman, as a successor. If this program had ever
enjoyed the backing of the Department of State, it was unknown to me, unknown
to anyone as far as I know. So anyway, they reveled
the supposedly nefarious operations, and relations just seemed to be getting
worse. At about this time, the will to resist in the Department of State was
about cracking. You had a new guy heading refugee affairs who wanted a refugee
at this point I should back up and discuss two issues that are running parallel
to these things. One is human rights violations in
Q: He got involved in a domestic scandal.
"WedTech." And this came about just at the
time, in 1987, so it didn't help our cause. He included on his delegation
Armando Valladares. Now Armando spoke very little
English. Here was the first case of a successful man on a
the refugees themselves, we had a continuing running dispute with INS. We felt
the public pressure was so great that we should be interviewing some of the
prisoners on a list which the Catholic bishops had taken to
So anyway, we had this issue which INS had blocked. The State Department's rationale was that if we didn't do this we would lose all support for our main objective, which was to restore the migration agreement of 1984. We couldn't have a regular refugee program and we couldn't have immigration as normal or visas as normal until we got the agreement back, but if we didn't do something we would lose everything. INS never could quite see that point. That's why they always had to be bulldozed, and Alan Nelson and Craig Raynsford felt that we weren't tough enough on the Cubans. They seemed to believe that if we got tough enough and wouldn't take anybody in, then the Cubans would give way. We were convinced the Cubans would not give way and we would just lose all credibility.
The situation in 1987, despite this, became worse. The pressures were immense, and there was an occasion in July of 1987 when Leo Cherne, head of the International Rescue Committee, came with Frank Calzón to see Elliott Abrams. I participated in the meeting. Their position was that we ought to be taking all these people out. It was a crime against humanity to leave any political prisoners. We should disassociate the issue from the Mariel excludables. Abrams and I had agreed with Calzón earlier that we would start with the people who had been in jail 10 years or longer and have a prioritized program which we could control. Calzón had said he thought that made sense. Now he wanted more. He wanted a program without prioritization in which we would take everybody. In the meantime, the Secretary of State had lunch with Armando Valladares, who persuaded him that we should be taking in people, and Shultz was willing to take anyone who had been in jail eight years or longer. This was without getting the migration agreement back.
things were coming to a climax within the Department of State. Elliott Abrams
met with two or three of his peers who had been antagonistic to our policy and
who had a proposal to change it abruptly. To my amazement Elliott gave in.
Apparently Cherne and Calzon
had persuaded him. The proposal was for a large and unstructured refugee
program which would be disassociated from the migration agreement. Abrams
asserted that it was the only way to head off the Lautanberg
Bill, a piece of legislation in the U.S. Senate also inspired and probably
drafted by Frank Calzon, which would not only have
resumed refugee processing but would have removed all restrictions on visa
issuance. The bill was advancing in the Senate and, if enacted, would have
completely eliminated any hope of persuading
four assistant secretaries concerned - for ARA, humanitarian affairs, consular
and refugee matters - then sent to Secretary Shultz a memorandum asking
approval of their proposal. Noting that it lacked a legal opinion, Secretary
Shultz sent it back for one. This allowed Mike Kozak,
with my support and cooperation, to draft a rebuttal spelling out why it was
essential to maintain our present stand if we hoped to restore the migration
agreement. We had to hold firm longer than the Cubans could. Secretary Shultz
agreed with us and turned down the proposal that would have jettisoned our
program. This ultimately saved the day and made it possible for us to oblige
that point, we had a lunch with the Cuban-American National Foundation. They
had wanted the lunch. Joan Clark, head of Consular Affairs, hosted the lunch,
and her deputy Ambassador Mike Newlin attended along
with Kozak and me, the main operatives of INS - not
Nelson but one of his top deputies, plus Raynsford,
Jorge Mas, and the people at the head of the
Cuban-American National Foundation. They explained that they wanted a voluntary
program where they could take out some former political prisoners who were in
third countries. We had no problem with that. They wanted some INS support for
that. INS had no problem with that. These were people who were not in
then this was the situation at about the beginning of November 1987. We were about to
have another meeting with the Russians in
anyway, Alarcón had told Jay Taylor
that said Kozak could come down to Havana with
anybody he wanted to bring along and talk about all sorts of issues including
radios, but not mentioning migration.
as luck would have it, their plane flying to
It was diverted to
met in Mike Kozak's hotel room, and they said that,
well, the migration agreement could be restored, but of course
went down to
we would get to this on the next session. Next came thCuban-American prisoners taking over Oakdale and
Q: Okay, we'll pick it up at that point, and we'll just not there that we're still talking about getting rid of the people in jail and the suspension of... Well, we're at the point where it looks like this lifting of our sanctions will go against the Cubans, and we'll pick it up there, and then we will pick up other things such as Central America, Canada, Cubans in Africa, and Soviet influence in Cuba, and Radio Martí and maybe TV - did that come in at that time?
SKOUG: TV Martí comes in in 1988.
Interviewed by: Thomas Stern
Initial interview date: 1996
Q: In 1985, you were appointed Director for the Center for Studies in Foreign Affairs, which was located in the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State.How did that come about?
HANS BINNENDIJK: Senator Percy had lost his election in November, 1984. My wife, Mary, had also worked for Percy; so his loss put both of us on the street. Senator Mac Mathias--R.Md--asked me whether I would be interested in joining his staff of a while. That was just a temporary job. So I started to look around and someone told me that there was vacancy at the Center. I went to see Steve Low, the Director of FSI, whom I had known slightly. Steve and I hit it off and he offered me the position of Director of the Center.
think the diplomatic simulations were very useful. That was the feed-back we
were getting from senior Department officials; it was not unusual for some of
them to call me up and ask that I schedule some more on different issues of
interests to them. But I think the preponderance of the initiatives came from
us. I think we had some very interesting simulations. In some cases, people did
come back to us to report that the exercise had made a difference in policy
formulation. The simulation process is a very powerful methodology. The Center
did not copy the Defense model exactly; that is, we did not have
"Blue" and "Red" teams which would tackle the problem
presented to them. Our exercises were very dynamic, with lots of role playing.
We did one on